


STATE OF WISCONSIN

HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

2023 - 2026



Version 08
Last Updated: 13 October 2023



PREFACE TO THE HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

MAJ GEN PAUL E. KNAPP

HOMELAND AND CYBER SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE GOVERNOR

On behalf of the Wisconsin Homeland Security Council, it is my pleasure to present to you the Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy 2023-2026. The initiatives and objectives included here within are the result of extensive collaborative planning and dialogue between a host of agencies, partners from across private and public sectors, and representatives from all levels of government.

These past four years have presented Wisconsin, and indeed the nation as a whole, with a series of unprecedented challenges. Ranging from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic to tragic mass shooting events, along with the many civil rights protests and unfortunate unlawful civil unrest that sometimes accompanied them, it is clear that the threats we face as a state will not only persist but evolve in the coming years. Throughout this, the protection and safety of the citizens of Wisconsin must and will remain our top priority.

Our state's strategy requires attentiveness, innovation, and implementation at all levels as we direct our focus toward seven strategic homeland security goals. While we maintain a strong footing to counter violent extremism and terrorism, we must also acknowledge the changing threat landscape. Today's security environment faces unprecedented threats from nation state actors with malevolent intent seeking to harm our nation and our state. We must be vigilant. It is more critical than ever that we protect our cyber infrastructure and build resilient cyber systems. We must also renew our efforts to protect our Wisconsin communities and families from the pervasive threat of illegal narcotics and their abuse. As we seek to counter both new and resurgent threats, we recognize that invariably, a robust all-hazards response capability remains one of our best tools to be postured for whatever we may face as a state.

To accomplish this security strategy, our homeland security enterprise must be as strong as our resolve. As a state, we must recognize that the structures of 10 and 20 years ago may no longer be sufficient to protect against the threats of the 21st century. As such, we must find opportunities and take deliberate action to strengthen our state's own homeland security framework and organizations.

In Wisconsin we will always believe in moving *forward*. Forward in our recognition and acknowledgement of threats, forward in our security structures and systems, and forward in our commitment to protect the citizens of Wisconsin.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul E. Knapp". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Maj Gen, WI Department of Military Affairs
The Adjutant General

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The *Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy 2023-2026* is the State of Wisconsin’s strategic framework for establishing homeland security goals and objectives in accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 8¹ aligned with enduring efforts to strengthen the state’s ability to develop, sustain and employ homeland security capabilities. This strategy is an evolution of the state’s past efforts to improve state homeland security building upon the *Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy 2019-2022*. This strategic plan is built upon a foundation of inclusive interagency collaboration² and is intended to implement a strategy that embraces Wisconsin’s evolving risk landscape while also recognizing significant changes within the national and international environment.

The Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy (WIHSS) is a statewide approach, inherently multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional. The WIHSS is applicable to state agencies, regional organizations, local, and tribal governments, private organizations, and the general public. All Wisconsin state agencies have a responsibility to support local authorities in their preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery efforts. This strategy also seeks to leverage public-private coordination to posture a whole-of-state approach to homeland security and emergency response.

To ensure alignment with federal priorities, many national strategic guidance documents were consulted throughout the development of the WIHSS. While not an exhaustive list, the following strategies include those most frequently referenced: *United States Department of Homeland Security (USDHS) Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2020-2024*, *USDHS Cybersecurity Strategy, May 2018*, and the *Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Strategic Intent, August 2019*.

Wisconsin’s homeland security goal is to protect our citizens’ safety, build resilient communities, and set the conditions to ensure equitable access to economic prosperity and a high quality of life within the state.

The Wisconsin Homeland Security Council has chosen seven strategic goals to focus on for the next four years (see Table 1). The WIHSS is however a living document and may change to stay relevant and useful over a multi-year implementation period in order to maximize the ability for partners at all levels to work towards the common goal of strengthening the state’s homeland security.

¹ *Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: National Preparedness*, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, available at <https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness> (last accessed July 13th, 2022).

² Reference Appendix A “Homeland Security Strategy Methodology” for further details on the strategy review methodology employed by the Homeland Security Council.

WISCONSIN HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC GOALS 2023-2026	
STRATEGIC GOAL ONE	PROTECT OUR CITIZENS AND RESOURCES BY STRENGTHENING HOMELAND SECURITY INITIATIVES WITHIN WISCONSIN
STRATEGIC GOAL TWO	STRENGTHEN THE STATE'S CAPABILITIES TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY
STRATEGIC GOAL THREE	ENSURE A ROBUST AND STATEWIDE ALL HAZARDS INCIDENT RESPONSE AND RECOVERY CAPABILITY
STRATEGIC GOAL FOUR	MITIGATE DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE AND REVERSE THE IMPACTS OF ILLEGAL NARCOTICS TRADE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE STATE
STRATEGIC GOAL FIVE	PROTECT THE STATE'S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENABLE RECOVERY OF DISRUPTED ESSENTIAL SERVICES
STRATEGIC GOAL SIX	ENHANCE THE STATE'S CAPABILITIES TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM INCLUDING FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TERRORISM
STRATEGIC GOAL SEVEN	RECOGNIZE AND MITIGATE THE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN STATE ADVERSARIES

Table 1 – Strategic Goals 2023-2026

The homeland security strategy is organized into three sections:

Section I outlines the strategic framework, inclusive of the State of Wisconsin’s homeland security purpose, mission, and vision. In addition, it outlines the various formal subcommittees of the Homeland Security Council as well as the informal working groups which may be convened to support homeland security initiatives over the next four years.

Section II outlines the strategic alignment and subsequent linkages between the state’s plan and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National Preparedness Goal five mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Grant Program aligns and supports the implementation of the National Preparedness Goal (NPG). This section also includes a jurisdictional profile of the State of Wisconsin.

Section III establishes the strategic goals of the state. The strategic goals are comprised of strategic objectives and supporting objectives which build upon one another to support progress towards the state’s goals. Supporting objectives are assigned to lead or co-lead agencies and are the building blocks upon which our strategic goals will be measured. The lead agency is responsible for convening all relevant stakeholders, facilitating advancement toward the designated objective, and providing progress updates if requested by the Homeland Security Council. The objectives included in this strategy will be achieved through partnership between the lead agency, other relevant state agencies, as well as additional local, tribal, state and federal partners as necessary.

SECTION I

FRAMEWORK

PURPOSE

This strategy is intended to guide and unify the homeland security efforts of state, local, and tribal governments as well as non-governmental partners through a comprehensive, multidisciplinary framework to advance homeland security in the State of Wisconsin.

VISION

A state prepared to navigate a constantly changing threat environment through the collaboration of forward-thinking public and private homeland security stakeholders, properly equipped to ensure social, economic, and political systems continue to meet the needs of Wisconsin citizens uninterrupted.

MISSION

To protect and prepare the state's economic, social, and political infrastructure against natural, foreign, and domestic threats across digital and physical environments to ensure minimal disruption to the daily lives of Wisconsin residents and businesses.

WISCONSIN HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL

The Wisconsin Homeland Security Council (HLSC) is the primary body for organizing and coordinating homeland security efforts within the state. Created in 2003 by executive order and recreated every four years by subsequent orders, the council is charged with advising the Governor and coordinating the efforts of state, tribal, and local officials as they pertain to homeland security threats.

The council meets every other month to share information and discuss key issues related to the status of homeland security in Wisconsin. Members of the public are welcome to attend the open session portion of the meetings. Agencies, organizations, and other key stakeholders may send officials to the meetings to gather and share information to improve their homeland security efforts. Council members are responsible for working closely with the agencies of the council and partner organizations on matters of homeland security and information sharing within Wisconsin.

The council is led by the Adjutant General of Wisconsin, who also serves as the Homeland and Cyber Security Advisor (HSA) to the Governor. The council consists of representatives from 16 state agencies and associations:

- Badger State Sheriffs Association
- City of Milwaukee Police Department
- Department of Administration – Division of Capitol Police
- Department of Administration – Division of Enterprise Technology
- Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection
- Department of Health Services – Division of Public Health
- Department of Corrections
- Department of Justice – Division of Criminal Investigation
- Department of Natural Resources
- Department of Transportation – Division of State Patrol
- Department of Military Affairs – Wisconsin Emergency Management

- Department of Military Affairs – Wisconsin National Guard
- Public Service Commission
- Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association
- Wisconsin Elections Commission
- Wisconsin State Fire Chiefs Association

SUBCOMMITTEES AND WORKGROUPS

The Homeland Security Council is the cornerstone of the State of Wisconsin’s interagency homeland security framework. However, the council recognizes a need to sub-organize and invite a cross section of external partners to further various homeland security initiatives. To that end, the council will form groups to address specific threats and/or undertake objectives that have been identified through the strategic planning process. These groups are organized into two types of groups 1) formal subcommittees of the council, and 2) informal working groups.

The Homeland Security Council works in coordination with the Office of the Governor to propose and establish subcommittees of the council. The existence of each subcommittee is formalized upon Governor appointment. Subcommittees are subject to open meeting rules and are required to produce a state level strategic plan which addresses the subcommittee’s mission area. Subcommittees will establish a charter inclusive of purpose, mission, vision, objectives, and intended membership to guide actions. Subcommittee’s will draft and present a state strategy to the council within 12 months of the adoption of the WIHSS 2023-2026.

The council recognizes not all objectives require a formal body or state strategy. To meet informal requirements while furthering inclusive collaboration, the council will form informal working groups which are tasked to bring together interagency partners for the purpose of sharing information and best practices, working towards accomplishment of any objectives or tasks which have been assigned by the council either directly to the working group lead(s) or via the Homeland Security Strategy.

Upon publication of this strategy there are to be two subcommittees and four workgroups which contribute to Wisconsin’s homeland security framework. These subcommittees and workgroups are as follows:

CYBERSECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE (CSS)

Co-Chair: Department of Administration Division of Enterprise Technology

Co-Chair: Department of Military Affairs

Guides efforts to advance Wisconsin’s cybersecurity posture through multidisciplinary collaboration on statewide initiatives and serves as the principal body for all advisory functions to the council on cybersecurity functions. The CSS drafts and adopts a state cybersecurity strategy every four years. The CSS also functions as the state's highest interagency body for the coordination of actions which achieve strategic cybersecurity objectives.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS SUBCOMMITTEE (CNS)

Co-Chair: Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigations

Co-Chair: Department of Military Affairs

Established upon publishing of the WI HSS 2023-2026 in accordance with Objective 4.1.2

Serves as the council’s lead body tasked with developing a state strategy to counter illegal narcotics and mitigate their effects within Wisconsin. It functions as an advisory body to the council, a strategic planning committee, and a lead for coordination efforts with state, local, and tribal partners. The CNS will seek to work in coordination with the State Council on Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse.

INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP (IAWG)

Lead: Department of Military Affairs Division of Wisconsin Emergency Management

Brings together the emergency management and response coordinators from state agencies to serve as a forum for information exchange, collaboration, and development of initiatives to achieve strategic response and recovery objectives. The group uses the state’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) to identify the capabilities, resources, and coordination necessary to respond to major emergencies and disasters, consistent with the tenets of FEMA’s National Preparedness Goal of creating a secure and resilient nation.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORKING GROUP (CIWG)

Lead: Department of Military Affairs Division of Emergency Management

Aligns private and public critical infrastructure stakeholders to address issues and make recommendations related to ongoing efforts to strengthen the security of Wisconsin critical infrastructure.

FOREIGN ADVERSARIAL INFLUENCE WORKING GROUP (FIWG)

Lead: Department of Military Affairs

Established upon publishing of the WI HSS 2023-2026 in accordance with Objective 7.1.1

Convenes state and federal partners to support national strategies aimed at mitigating the effect of adversarial foreign nation-states within the homeland. The FIWG identifies methods to further this effort within Wisconsin. The FIWG serves as an advisory body to the council and will work to develop methods and products towards this goal for use by partners around the state.

INFORMATION SHARING WORKING GROUP (ISWG)

Lead: Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation – Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center

Assesses systems, processes and procedures which lead to strengthened information and intelligence sharing and provides recommendations for initiatives which enhance Wisconsin’s ability to share information. The ISWG serves as a principle advisory group to the council on matters related to information/intelligence sharing.

IMPLEMENTATION

The Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy is a strategic plan intended to guide actions along the path toward eventual goal achievement. Because of the strategy’s purpose to provide broad principle and long-term goals, it is not an all-inclusive document and is not designed to encompass all of the goals, objectives or action plans of agencies responsible for the wide range of homeland security functions. The strategy is informed by other strategic documents and planning efforts. In turn, this strategy informs associated operational plans and related capability development. Figure 1 (while not exhaustive) provides a pictorial overview of where the homeland security strategy fits within other state plans as well as the interrelated dependencies of those plans.




Figure 1 – State Plan Alignment and Implementation

SECTION II

STRATEGY ALIGNMENT

MISSION AREAS

To organize and focus preparedness efforts, FEMA’s National Preparedness Goal identifies five core mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery, as well as 32 core capabilities. These mission areas serve as an aid in organizing our national and state preparedness activities and enabling integration and coordination across core capabilities.

In this strategy, each of the strategic goals is aligned with at least one mission area as a means for focusing the scope of the effort. However, we do recognize that the mission areas are interrelated, and thus certain actions in support of strategic and supporting objectives will support multiple mission areas.

As mission areas also link to core capabilities, so do our strategic goals. A full crosswalk between the 2023-2026 Homeland Security Strategy strategic goals and FEMA’s 32 core capabilities can be found in Appendix C.

NATIONAL PRIORITIES

The table below indicates the extent to which each WIHSS strategic goal aligns to the 2022 Homeland Security Program Grant national priorities.

	WI HSS STRATEGIC GOALS						
NATIONAL PRIORITIES	GOAL ONE	GOAL TWO	GOAL THREE	GOAL FOUR	GOAL FIVE	GOAL SIX	GOAL SEVEN
Enhancing the protection of soft targets/crowded places					✓	✓	
Enhancing information and intelligence sharing and cooperation with federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Combating domestic violent extremism					✓	✓	✓
Enhancing community preparedness and resilience		✓	✓	✓		✓	
Enhancing cybersecurity		✓					✓
Enhancing election security		✓	✓		✓		

Table 2 – Strategic Goals Crosswalk to National Priorities

JURISDICTIONAL PROFILE

OVERVIEW

The State of Wisconsin is approximately 65,498³ square miles and consists of 1,852 cities, towns, villages, and 734 special districts divided into 72 counties. Wisconsin's borders with Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois and Michigan's Upper Peninsula include approximately 800 miles of Great Lakes coastline, and nearly 200 miles of Mississippi River shoreline.

Wisconsin has a population of 5.89 million people. Although over two-thirds of the state is considered rural, only one-third of Wisconsin's residents populate rural areas. The remaining two-thirds of the population inhabit the remaining third of the state, with Milwaukee, Madison, Green Bay, Kenosha and Racine as the five largest population centers.

The jurisdictional boundary of Wisconsin also encompasses 11 federally recognized tribes⁴, including the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, Ho-Chunk Nation, Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, Oneida Nation, Forest County Potawatomi, Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, St. Croix Chippewa, Sokaogon Chippewa (Mole Lake), and Stockbridge-Munsee.




Figure 2 – Devils Lake State Park
Baraboo, WI

WISCONSIN KEY ELEMENTS

Education

Wisconsin has 2,190 public schools in 421 public school districts⁵, as well as 769 private schools across the state. Wisconsin also has 67 colleges and universities per the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education.⁶

Home Rule

Under the home rule doctrine, if a policy is entirely a matter of a city, town or county's local affairs and government, the legislature is prohibited from enacting a law that would preempt local regulation of that matter unless the matter is exclusively of statewide concern and the legislation applies uniformly to every municipality or county. Home rule is authorized by the Wisconsin Constitution and state statutes for cities and villages and from a state statute for counties. Under home rule, some state agencies will be unable to provide material support to an area unless authorized by statute or until support is requested by the jurisdiction.

³ "Wisconsin Population 2022." Wisconsin Population 2022 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs), World Population Review, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/states/wisconsin-population>.

⁴ "American Indians in Wisconsin - Overview." Wisconsin Department of Health Services, 24 Mar. 2022, <https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/minority-health/population/amind-pop.htm#:~:text=Wisconsin%20is%20home%20to%201,Cliff%20Band%20of%20Lake%20Superior>.

⁵ "Wisconsin Public Schools at a Glance." Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 2021, https://dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/eis/pdf/schools_at_a_glance.pdf.

⁶ "2021 Update Public File." The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education, 2021, <https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fcarnegieclassifications.acenet.edu%2Fdownloads%2FCCIHE2021-PublicData.xlsx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK>.

Elections

In Wisconsin, elections are run at the city, village, and town level, making it one of the most decentralized elections systems in the United States. In total there are 1,581 municipalities, each of which manages its own elections process. The primary authority is provided to the city, village, or town clerk, who is responsible for overseeing the elections in their jurisdiction.⁷

Large Venues and Events

Wisconsin is home to three large venues including Lambeau Field (Green Bay), American Family Field (Milwaukee) and the Fiserv Forum (Milwaukee). In addition to recurring mass gatherings at these locations, Wisconsin is home to many large-scale events that attract crowds in the tens to hundreds of thousands. Included in these attractions are the following annual events:

EXAMPLES OF SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL EVENTS IN WISCONSIN	
WISCONSIN STATE FAIR	Milwaukee, WI Attracts over 1 million attendees over 11 days ⁸
EAA AIRVENTURE	Oshkosh, WI Attracts over 600,000 attendees over 7 days ⁹
SUMMERFEST	Milwaukee, WI Attracts over 400,000 attendees over 11 days ¹⁰
AMERICAN BIRKEBEINER	Hayward, WI Attracts over 40,000 spectators and 10,000 participants for one day

Table 3 – Examples of Significant Annual Events in Wisconsin

Although the events listed above represent those with the highest daily attendance, Wisconsin also boasts a wide array of additional concerts, races, sporting events, conventions, and other attractions on an annual or one-time basis. In recent years, Wisconsin has hosted the 2018, 2019 and 2022 NOBULL CrossFit Games, 2021 Ryder Cup, 2020 Democratic National Convention, and Road America, among others.

Tourism

Wisconsin is a popular destination for tourists due to its 15,000+ lakes, sprawling state parks and trails, and other seasonal attractions. In the summer months, northern and central Wisconsin experience significant population growth due to out-of-state visitors with secondary homes on or near Wisconsin lakes. This is also seen in the Wisconsin Dells, an area approximately 20 square miles in South Central Wisconsin. Known as the Waterpark Capital of the World, this area alone sees over 4 million visitors annually.¹¹

⁷ “Wisconsin Elections.” Wisconsin Elections Commission, 25 July 2022, <https://elections.wi.gov/elections>.

⁸ “Attendance.” Wisconsin State Fair, 22 August 2022, <https://wistatefair.com/fair/attendance/>.

⁹ “EAA AirVenture Oshkosh 2021: Facts and Figures for an Outstanding Year.” EAA, EAA AirVenture, 3 Aug. 2021, <https://www.eaa.org/airventure/eea-airventure-news-and-multimedia/eea-airventure-news/eea-airventure-oshkosh/08-03-2021-eea-airventure-oshkosh-2021-facts-and-figures-for-an-outstanding-year#:~:text=Attendance%3A%20Approximately%20608%2C000%20%E2%80%93%20Only%20the,percent%20of%202019%27s%20record%20total.>

¹⁰ Mueller, Matt. “Summerfest Reveals 2021 Attendance Numbers.” OnMilwaukee, 11 July 2020, <https://onmilwaukee.com/articles/summerfest-2021-attendance-numbers>.

¹¹ Wisconsin Dells Economic Impact, Wisconsin Dells, <https://www.wisdells.com/Media/Facts-and-Figures/Economic-Impact>.

RESPONSE ORGANIZATION

Wisconsin is subdivided into several regions for public health and safety purposes. Each subdivision is established by respective agencies based primarily on geography and specific mission such as emergency management, Aligned Law Enforcement Response Teams (ALERT), urban search and rescue (Wisconsin Task Force-1), hazardous material response, All-Hazard Incident Management Teams (AHIMT), and Healthcare Emergency Preparedness Coalitions (HERC). Homeland Security Grant funds currently support projects associated with all of the aforementioned regional schemas. FEMA awards Homeland Security grant awards based on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA's relative risk methodology and statutory minimums pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended. FEMA's Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) results do not impact grant allocations or awards. Each state and territory receives a minimum allocation under the Homeland Security Grant Program using thresholds established in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended. Based on the DHS/FEMA risk assessment methodology, Wisconsin receives the lowest tier of funding allocated to states.

WISCONSIN RISKS

Overall, Wisconsin ranks "Very Low" on FEMA's National Risk Index. Wisconsin's relative risk score is rated 3.26 out of a maximum of 100. Likewise, Wisconsin's Vulnerability and Consequence scores rated 57.99 and 10.10, respectively. Despite the universal threat of terrorist activities being of concern, Wisconsin's risk index does not rise to the level of other states that rate "Very High" on FEMA's National Risk Index. However, despite having a "Very Low" risk profile, it is not zero.

The most recent THIRA identified 16 contextual areas of concern that may potentially impact or disrupt the safety and security of Wisconsin's citizens. By using FEMA's risk assessment process, the THIRA allows Wisconsin Emergency Management and various stakeholders to determine the anticipated likelihood and consequences of hazards across the state. Given Wisconsin's geographic, demographic, and socioeconomic diversity, there are significant regional differences in how such anticipated consequences will impact the state. The estimated impacts would challenge the state's ability to address the threat or hazard in at least one of the 32 core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal. In addition, Wisconsin's THIRA serves as the risk assessment portion of the State of Wisconsin's Hazard Mitigation Plan (WHMP) and therefore includes all relevant natural threats and hazards of concern. The threats and hazards of concern include seven natural, two technological, and four human caused threats or hazards. The THIRA does not rank them, but for each of these threats and hazards a scenario has been developed to outline conditions that might occur. All hazards identified have the potential to disrupt community lifelines or pose a threat to vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure or facilities.

WISCONSIN'S RISKS		
NATURAL HAZARDS	TECHNICAL HAZARDS	HUMAN-CAUSED HAZARDS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Severe weather • Flooding • Dam failure • Landslides/land subsidence • Coastal hazards • Drought/extreme heat • Winter storms/extreme cold • Wildfires • Emerging infectious diseases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hazardous material contamination or release. • Radiological release from a nuclear power plant or transportation-related release. • Dam failure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic Terrorism • Agro-terrorism • Active shooter • Cyberterrorism • Civil Disturbance

Table 4 – Wisconsin’s Identified Risks

According to the State of Wisconsin’s Hazard Mitigation Plan, flooding and tornadoes are the most frequent and damaging natural hazards in the state, followed by severe winter storms and wildfires. Major floods have occurred in eight of the last ten years. With an average of 21 tornadoes per year, Wisconsin ranks 17th nationally in frequency and number of fatalities. Since 2000, Wisconsin has received a total of seven federal disaster declarations involving flooding, severe storms, and tornadoes. In addition, the state received two emergency declarations for snow removal following major winter storms. Record flooding in southern Wisconsin in 2007 and 2008 caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damages to homes, businesses, local infrastructure, and agricultural losses. The August 2007 flooding event caused more than \$112 million in damage with over 4,000 households seeking federal disaster assistance. The 2008 flooding event shattered records, with damage exceeding \$765 million and more than 40,000 households requesting disaster assistance with FEMA. The 2008 flooding became the most expensive disaster in state history.



Figure 3 – Sandbags placed to alleviate flooding in Monona, WI

SECTION III

STRATEGIC GOAL ONE

Protect our citizens and resources by strengthening homeland security initiatives within Wisconsin.

INTRODUCTION

The homeland security environment is an evolving landscape, informed by past, present and emergent threats as well as mission areas identified by the state’s homeland security professionals at all levels and across a multitude of disciplines. The evolving nature of threats requires a flexible and adaptive approach to homeland security for the state. It is imperative that Wisconsin builds upon our existing frameworks, while embracing new opportunities and new structures to ensure that as a state, we are best postured to provide security to our communities and citizens.

In recent years, Wisconsin’s approach to homeland security has focused on the collective power of collaborative efforts undertaken by many agencies. This approach has continued to strengthen the connective tissue between agencies and efforts and has enhanced cross-sector information sharing. Building upon this approach, we recognize agency-driven efforts must also be accompanied by a central institution with the formal support and authority necessary to carry out long term initiatives and ensure the sustainability of the state’s homeland security infrastructure.

The council will accomplish this by proposing formalized roles and responsibilities for the state’s Homeland and Cyber Security Advisor to the Governor, as well as the establishment of a homeland security team to the Governor, the HSA, and stakeholders at all levels and around the state. Wisconsin must now become a leader in the region, embrace our *forward* motto, and keep pace with our neighboring states in the region by adopting an enterprise that is interdisciplinary, collaborative, and has a core of dedicated staff to support the increasingly complex and important homeland security mission.¹²

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

Enhance the information sharing efforts and infrastructure related to homeland security.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

	Supporting Objectives	Lead Agency
1.1.1	The HSA, in coordination with the Homeland Security Council and the Office of the Governor, will identify the Governor’s critical information requirements ¹³ pertaining to homeland security, and develop and implement a reporting model for when the requirements are met.	HSA in coordination with the Office of the Governor and HLSC

¹² “A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security,” National Governor’s Association Center for Best Practices, February 2019, pg. 15-17. *The NGA Guide to Homeland Security reports that the landscape of homeland security organizational practices amongst the 56 states and territories is as such (approximate data given state variations) 13 - standalone department or agency, 33 - division or office within another state department or agency, 10- rely on a council, a commission or an office directly within their state governor’s office*

¹³Critical Information Requirements (CIR) refers to identified reporting requirements which generate leadership understanding and provide opportunities for information feedback and leader decision space. CIR support a leader’s ability to make timely decisions with situational understanding.

1.1.2	Enhance the consistency of intel briefs to local, county, tribal and state stakeholders regarding major initiatives, specific concerns, and persons of interest.	WI DOJ - WSIC
1.1.3	Research, identify and develop a plan for statewide adoption by public safety partners of an information sharing system to provide immediate access to timely and actionable intel that does not require additional data entry. <i>See also Supporting Objective 6.3.1</i>	ISWG

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

Pursue efforts which strengthen homeland security as a formal function supported by state government within Wisconsin.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

	Supporting Objectives	Lead Agency
1.2.1	Formalize the role, the authorities, and purpose of the HSA.	DMA
1.2.2	In coordination with the Homeland Security Council, develop and propose options for establishing a staff which works for the HSA dedicated to the coordination and administration of all efforts related to homeland security.	DMA
1.2.3	Reinstitute the Governor’s Annual Report on Homeland Security by evaluating the existing product, establishing a process for yearly development, and producing a 2023 Annual Report.	HLSC
1.2.4	Strengthen the Homeland Security Council’s integration with and representation at state level conferences, to include the Governor’s Conference on Homeland Security and Emergency Management.	HLSC in coordination with DMA
1.2.5	Continue to assess the efficacy of standing subcommittees and working groups, adjusting existing groups where necessary, and initiating new work groups or subcommittees to address gaps.	HLSC



Figure 4 - Wisconsin State Capitol Building

STRATEGIC GOAL TWO

Strengthen the state's capabilities to prevent and respond to malicious cyber activity.

INTRODUCTION

Enhancing the cybersecurity of the State of Wisconsin remains one of the great goals and challenges we face as a state. Access to information and technology is relatively inexpensive and there exists a pervasive and omnipresent threat within cyber space. Although this incredible access is an extraordinary boon for citizens, our state, and our society, as access spreads and our citizens build an ever-increasing digital life portfolio, they also face greater risks. As our physical lives become more intertwined with our digital lives, we increasingly come under threat of real damage from a variety of nefarious actors. As such, cybersecurity is undeniably a matter of homeland security.¹⁴

It is critical that we continue to take action to enhance our cybersecurity posture and ensure long lasting cybersecurity health within Wisconsin. As a state, we cannot rely solely on the initiatives of external entities to accomplish this, whether that be private technology companies, the federal government, or other public institutions. Rather, our state agencies must embrace the leadership mantle and provide clear and actionable guidance to enhance and lead our whole-of-government efforts.

The Homeland Security Council has empowered the Cybersecurity Subcommittee to serve as the lead interagency body to further the collective initiatives of the council within this space. The subcommittee will set the course for the state, through the state cybersecurity strategy, to ensure Wisconsin is on the right track for future security.

Furthermore, the council intends to coordinate with the subcommittee and its stakeholders, to pursue a number of efforts with an eye on the future cybersecurity posture of the state. It is the council's goal to bring forward new recommendations for legislative changes which will codify how Wisconsin responds to cyber incidents and protect our responders. We will work with our partners to enhance both our long-term workforce pipeline as well as education initiatives to build future generations ready to take on the challenges we face in this area. We intend to reinforce areas of successful effort, notably the Wisconsin Cyber Response Team (CRT), which has proven to be an immensely valuable resource for state and local partners.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

Improve the state's cyber incident response capabilities.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

	Supporting Objectives	Lead Agency
2.1.1	Finalize and adopt the role, responsibilities, and capabilities of the CRT and publish in Wisconsin Emergency Response Plan (WERP) Cyber Incident Response Annex and next state Cybersecurity Strategy.	DMA in coordination with DET
2.1.2	Develop and distribute a cyber resource catalog to increase awareness of the availability of incident response support throughout the state.	DMA in coordination with DET

¹⁴ "Cybersecurity Strategy," United States Department of Homeland Security, May 15, 2018. pg. 3-4.

2.1.3	Evaluate and shape the future model for cyber incident response to include sustainable funding and technological advancements that build upon the existing model.	DMA in coordination with DET
2.1.4	Exercise the process and ties between cyber incident response and physical consequence management in an incident response situation.	DMA in coordination with DET

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

Strengthen the state’s cybersecurity through enhanced policy initiatives and subsequent governance.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

2.2.1	Draft language for proposed policy to strengthen the state’s cybersecurity framework and capabilities as it pertains to the roles and responsibilities of key cybersecurity officials within the state of Wisconsin.	CSS
2.2.2	Further clarify and formalize the governance for cybersecurity in the state including the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roles and responsibilities of entities that comprise the cybersecurity framework, inclusive of the Subcommittee, working groups, information sharing entities, and any non-official entities. • Adopt and publish best practices/voluntary standards pertaining to cyber hygiene and security and develop a mechanism for recognizing local entities that choose to implement the standards in their organization. 	CSS in coordination with DMA and DET
2.2.3	Assess current criminal statutes to identify opportunities for modernization in order to increase their efficacy in incidents involving cybersecurity.	DOJ

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3

Enhance information sharing and relationship building amongst cyber professionals and stakeholders statewide.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

2.3.1	Develop a state-managed and produced intel and information sharing method that is accessible and actionable for state stakeholders. Ensure secure and non-secure methods to protect sensitive intel.	CSS in coordination with ISWG
2.3.2	Continue to host the Annual Governor's Conference on Cybersecurity to foster relationship building and education.	DET in coordination with DMA
2.3.3	Identify new sectors or industries with which to partner to enhance information sharing networks and assess how existing partnerships may aid in building these relationships.	CSS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4

Pursue statewide efforts to strengthen cybersecurity protection and mitigation.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

2.4.1	Delineate and promote the role of cybersecurity assessments in the State of Wisconsin, inclusive of self, external, and federal assessments.	CSS in coordination with CRT
2.4.2	Implement the State Identity Access Management (IAM) initiative "My Wisconsin ID" to enable access to multiple government systems in a secure way for Wisconsin residents.	DET
2.4.3	Research and propose funding sources able to be used toward defining, adopting, and implementing cybersecurity foundational standards within the state.	CSS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 5

Pursue greater diversity in the field and expand education and training opportunities as well as recruitment and retention of talent.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

2.5.1	Promote retention of cybersecurity professionals through increased access to training opportunities.	DET in coordination with DWD, higher education, and DPI
2.5.2	Enhance the cyber posture of Wisconsinites through age-appropriate and accessible training and education.	DET in coordination with DWD, higher education, and DPI
2.5.3	Expand the pool of talent within the cybersecurity field by enhancing education and engagement opportunities available to historically underrepresented populations.	DET in coordination with DWD, higher education and DPI

STRATEGIC GOAL THREE

Ensure a robust and statewide all hazards incident response and recovery capability.

INTRODUCTION

Our state will never be fully impervious to the effects of natural or human-caused disasters. Present threats as well as emerging threats across all-hazards require state, local, tribal and territorial governments, as well as our private sector partners, to develop, resource and train robust capabilities to respond to and ultimately recover from anything that may strike our communities. We recognize that a strong all-hazards response capability is the cornerstone of incident response. Regardless of the threat, a robust and capable response framework is key to both saving lives and protecting property.

This strategy intends to build upon decades of effective emergency management within Wisconsin, calling attention to existing partnerships and recognizing opportunities for new relationships to strengthen our whole-of-community approach. This is key to building resilient communities. Public-private partnerships serve as a force multiplier and will strengthen resilient communities as well as augment government response capabilities.

We will continue to strengthen state response capability through rigorous planning efforts, interagency initiatives, and a robust training and exercise program. As these opportunities continue to prepare our state for highly catastrophic, low probability events, this strategic goal also highlights the importance of tailoring efforts to the individual needs of the community mindful of the hazards they face, the resources available, and the engagement of stakeholders through a framework of integrated preparedness planning.

The State of Wisconsin, in close coordination with public and private partners from across the state, can effectively manage emergencies and mitigate the harm to Wisconsin communities through preparation, rapid response, and commitment to supporting long-term recovery efforts.¹⁵

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

Track and adopt relevant emerging trends in emergency management.

Supporting Objectives		Lead Agency
3.1.1	Align Wisconsin’s methods for typing assets, resources, and capabilities to be consistent with the National Qualification System (NQS).	WEM
3.1.2	Modernize Wisconsin’s emergency management learning management system, Training Wisconsin, by increasing its capabilities such as virtual training delivery and credential tracking.	WEM
3.1.3	Adopt and continue implementing the Integrated Preparedness Plan (IPP) and Integrated Preparedness Plan Workshop (IPPW) model for statewide planning per FEMA doctrine.	WEM

¹⁵ “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2020-2024,” United States Department of Homeland Security pg. 44-50. Strategic Goal 3 aligns to USDHS Strategic Goal 5 which emphasizes the need to strengthen preparedness and resilience, while maintaining readily available response capabilities.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

Enhance public and private partnerships and sustain programs which develop capabilities and capacity for incident response and recovery.

Supporting Objectives		Lead Agency
3.2.1	Integrate the Business Emergency Operations Center (BEOC) and Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) into short and long-term recovery capabilities statewide through coordinated planning, training, and exercises.	WEM
3.2.2	Build a mechanism for developing emergency management surge capacity capable of deploying to support incidents or emergencies that do not warrant a state or federal emergency declaration.	WEM
3.2.3	Establish a BEOC resource portal that can be used to link resource requests with available private sector resources offered to support incident response and recovery efforts	WEM
3.2.4	Increase the availability and usage of personnel capable of supporting the mental and behavioral health needs of responders by expanding training opportunities for local agencies and conducting outreach to responder groups to emphasize the importance of maintaining this capability.	DHS in coordination with WEM
3.2.5	Continue to train emergency response personnel at all levels on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) and initiate delivery of new courses to meet identified gaps as needed.	WEM
3.2.6	Plan and conduct an interagency full-scale exercise focused on improving the state's capability to recover from a disaster.	WEM

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3

Enhance public health emergency preparedness and response infrastructure.

Supporting Objectives		Lead Agency
3.3.1	Improve the active surveillance capability of the state's public health monitoring system, increasing the rapid identification of clusters of illness that may be indicative of larger concerns.	DHS
3.3.2	Develop and implement a plan for a 60-90-day medical stockpile, inclusive of policies, procedures, and systems for distribution.	DHS
3.3.3	Update the Infectious Disease Annex to the Department of Health Services Emergency Operations Plan and exercise the interagency response framework to future pandemic events.	DHS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4

Enhance the state's ability to respond to all hazard incidents by strengthening state level initiatives.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

3.4.1	Establish a state watch desk to facilitate prompt multi-agency coordination when incidents or emergencies occur.	DMA in coordination with DOT, DNR and DHS.
3.4.2	Adopt and implement the incident support model (ISM) of coordinating emergency response within the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).	WEM
3.4.3	Strengthen the state logistics management capability to maintain distribution management plans, increase Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) participation, manage staging area site lists and memorandum of understanding (MOU)s, and resource management.	WEM
3.4.4	Develop a plan to utilize non-cellular nor internet-based communications to coordinate with state, local, tribal, and federal partners to ensure continuity of government during incidents which significantly degrade primary methods of coordination.	DOA in coordination with DMA
3.4.5	Build and maintain specialty response team capabilities at the state level for all-hazard response, including but not limited to WI TF1, the state Incident Management Team (IMT), the CRT and Aligned Law Enforcement Response Teams (ALERT).	DMA
3.4.6	Enhance our ability to rapidly identify critical agriculture producers when an incident occurs by expanding the identification of entities covered by the Produce Safety Rule.	DATCP
3.4.7	Build upon the SEOC's existing online collaboration tools to facilitate virtual emergency operations center (EOC) operations from anywhere in the state.	WEM

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 5

Support programs and initiatives that improve individual and community preparedness.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

3.5.1	Increase preparedness outreach to both the general public, and private sector through promotion of and engagement in existing programs such as Ready Wisconsin, Student Tools for Emergency Planning (STEP), and the Business Emergency Operations Center.	WEM
3.5.2	Strengthen overall community preparedness and resilience by identifying and implementing ways in which existing programs can better support historically underserved areas as well as individuals with functional and access needs.	WEM in coordination with DHS
3.5.3	Develop a process to author, train and publish Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) messages in languages other than English using pre-written templates.	WEM

STRATEGIC GOAL FOUR

Mitigate drug-related violence and reverse the impacts of illegal narcotics trade and drug trafficking organizations within the state.

INTRODUCTION

The Homeland Security Council recognizes the deleterious effects of illegal narcotics on our communities and the overall risks the illegal narcotic trade and its associated adverse effects pose to our collective homeland security. *“This call to action comes at a critical moment. For the first time in our Nation’s history we have passed the tragic milestone of 100,000 deaths resulting from drug overdoses in a 12-month period. Since 1999, drug overdoses have killed approximately 1 million Americans. These are sons and daughters, parents and grandparents, neighbors and friends, and classmates and coworkers.”*¹⁶

Wisconsin is not immune from the effects of illegal narcotics use currently plaguing the country. Illegal drug use and drug related violence pose a significant threat to the health and well-being of our citizens and the communities which make up our state. This threat and its subsequent harmful impact pose a threat as great as any natural disaster or terrorist organization.

Opioid and drug overdose fatalities pose a particular challenge to our communities,¹⁷ and the harmful effects of such incidents extend beyond individual citizens. The rise of fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances (FRS) has increased the lethal potency of illegal drugs resulting in an even higher number of fatal cases. The rapid rise of foreign-produced fentanyl, manufactured in clandestine laboratories and laced into illegal street narcotics, has become a significant contributor to a rise in overdose deaths.¹⁸

Furthermore, drug trafficking organizations, including international cartels, routinely operate within the state’s borders, operating distribution networks which range from individual doses to kilogram-level quantities.¹⁹ In addition, the presence and activity of transnational criminal organizations within the state generate additional crime, ranging from smuggling to money laundering.²⁰

Recognizing the threat posed by the illegal narcotics trade, the WIHSS 23-26 aims to address the effects of the illegal drug trade within the state over the next four years. In alignment with national strategy, Wisconsin will seek to take *action* along three lines of effort: prevention efforts, treatment and recovery initiatives, and interdiction efforts meant to reduce availability of illegal narcotics.²¹ Central to these efforts is the establishment of the Counter-Narcotics Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Council. The first objective of the subcommittee is to develop a state-wide counternarcotics strategy utilizing an interagency and multi-jurisdictional approach to find whole-of-government solutions to this issue.

Additionally, the subcommittee will seek to work closely with the State Council on Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse (SCAODA), recognizing the importance of efforts already underway throughout the state.

¹⁶ “National Drug Control Strategy,” A Report by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, April 2022, pg. 6.

¹⁷ “Wisconsin Opioid Dashboard,” Wisconsin Department of Health Services, <https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/opioids/dashboards.htm>, (Last Accessed on July 13th 2022). Note: Opioid deaths in Wisconsin rose 34% from 2014 to 2020.

¹⁸ “National Drug Threat Assessment,” United States Department of Justice - Drug Enforcement Administration, March 2021, pg. 8.

¹⁹ “North Central High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Threat Assessment,” North Central High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), June 10 2021, pg. 32-34.

²⁰ “National Drug Threat Assessment,” pg. 69-70.

²¹ “National Drug Control Strategy,” A Report by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, April 2022, pg. 3-18

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

Enhance intel/information sharing and deconfliction amongst government agencies at all jurisdictional levels.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

4.1.1	Improve the coordination of intel sharing, by developing and adopting standard protocols, processes, and necessary systems for enhanced intel sharing among task forces and agencies. Inclusive of greater utilization of the HIDTA Watch Desk as well as WI DOJ WSIC.	ISWG
4.1.2	Establish a counter-narcotics subcommittee (CNS) within the Homeland Security Council to develop and maintain a state strategy on counter-narcotics and address cross-sector statewide initiatives, ensuring coordination with the State Council on Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse (SCAODA) where appropriate.	HLSC
4.1.3	Develop a common operating picture of the illegal drug trafficking threat in Wisconsin by leveraging state threat assessments and sharing with partners.	CNS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

Strengthen statewide narcotic interdiction efforts.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

4.2.1	Promote Wisconsin National Guard (WING) resources for ground observation to local law enforcement, including the process for requesting support when necessary.	WING
4.2.2	Continue to increase highway interdiction by enhancing existing Wisconsin State Patrol (WSP) initiative that pairs WSP inspectors and interdiction strike teams at Safety and Weight Enforcement Facilities.	WSP
4.2.3	Enhance existing parcel interdiction by providing training and education and increasing the percentage of follow up investigations.	CNS
4.2.4	Identify and evaluate funding avenues to increase narcotics detection and testing resources and capabilities such as testing equipment, and additional trained K-9s.	CNS
4.2.5	Pursue state funding to secure a platform capable of aerial observation for counternarcotics, search and rescue, and incident awareness purposes to replace previously federal funded platform.	DMA

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3

Increase substance abuse prevention and mitigation efforts within Wisconsin.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

4.3.1	Initiate and strengthen strategic partnerships at the state, regional, and local levels to increase awareness of resources, evidence-based best practices, and opportunities for support.	DHS
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4.3.2	Increase state-supported harm-reduction initiatives in K-12 education settings.	DPI in coordination with DHS
4.3.3	Establish and implement a pilot program for local jurisdictions to pursue the elimination of vacant, deteriorated homes used for illegal narcotics trade and use.	DMA
4.3.4	Amplify awareness and educational messaging by partnering with existing stakeholders such as regional prevention centers and coalitions.	DHS
4.3.5	Evaluate the impact of lessened post-conviction accountability on recurring drug use and identify alternative solutions for mitigating negative impacts.	CNS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4

Stem and reverse the trend of overdoses in Wisconsin.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

4.4.1	Issue a recommendation for the statewide use of and contribution into the HIDTA Overdose Detection Mapping Application Program (ODMAP) by public safety personnel, and address barriers to participation.	CNS
4.4.2	Increase access to treatment and recovery programs and strengthen public messaging campaigns regarding access to those programs.	CNS in coordination with DHS
4.4.3	Support the development of multiagency overdose rapid response teams by highlighting successful programs, providing guidance on how to initiate them, and identifying strategies for implementation in rural areas.	DHS
4.4.4	Increase attention to diversion medical registrant cases by increasing training to district attorneys and encouraging proactive engagement.	CNS
4.4.5	Assess jurisdictions that do not have or utilize an overdose review board and provide targeted outreach to assist with awareness and implementation. Continue to provide guidance to new and existing boards on how to inform and prepare the community following the review process.	DHS
4.4.6	Implement mobile opioid treatment programs and increase education of their use and benefit with multi-disciplinary partners.	DHS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 5

Strengthen drug task forces across the state.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

4.5.1	Reinforce state-sponsored narcotics task forces by funding increased analyst positions and initiating the integration of state law enforcement personnel into local task forces.	CNS
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4.5.2	Develop and provide resources to district attorneys pertaining to the prosecution of drug-related violence.	DOJ/DLS
4.5.3	Identify mechanisms to enhance the coordination of cross-jurisdictional investigations and prosecution.	DOJ/DLS
4.5.4	Continue to participate as a partner in the Native American Drug and Gang Initiative and identify opportunities to enhance engagement with and promotion of the initiative.	DCI

STRATEGIC GOAL FIVE

Protect the state's critical infrastructure and enable recovery of disrupted essential services.

INTRODUCTION

Our modern society relies upon uninterrupted access to essential services. Much of our economy is built upon just-in-time supplies. The state's critical infrastructure is key to our economic prosperity, as well as our state's high quality of life. As a nation, we face a complex threat environment, as nation-state actors and adversarial competitors seek to advance objectives through hybrid tactics, with the goal of degrading our society's functions and to add increased risk on our most critical infrastructure.²² Natural hazards also remain a prevalent threat to our infrastructure and have repeatedly proven capable of straining or even shutting down key essential services elsewhere in the nation.

A thorough understanding of the critical infrastructure which exists within the state is of the utmost importance to our efforts during all phases of an incident. We must recognize that the functions within our society on which we so depend, life-line sectors such as water/wastewater, electricity, and transportation, are in fact "systems of systems."²³ Individual nodes form system, which form sectors, all with incredibly complex interdependencies and a reliance on global supply chains. As a result, our critical infrastructure is increasingly at risk for disruption from both natural disaster and human-caused incidents.

Wisconsin's economic prosperity, and in fact much of our state's identity, is built upon complex agriculture and farming systems. The "dairy state's" key economic sectors are dependent upon geographically dispersed infrastructure systems, the vast majority of which are owned by private sector industry.

It is as important as it ever has been to invest in efforts to protect our state's infrastructure. To do this we must seek opportunities to leverage diverse data sets and pull together interagency efforts which build common data and shared understanding. We must build trusted partnerships between public sector government and our private partners across all critical infrastructure sectors. This strategy reinvigorates existing objectives to support these efforts. Notably, the council intends to reinforce the work of the Critical Infrastructure Working Group in an effort to strengthen an interagency approach to objectives which enhance our state's ability to protect critical infrastructure, both public and private.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

Identify public and private critical infrastructure.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

	Supporting Objectives	Lead Agency
5.1.1	Develop policy for protecting critical infrastructure information at the state level to facilitate information sharing with private partners.	DMA in coordination with CIWG
5.1.2	Maintain, organize, and prioritize a comprehensive data set of public and private critical infrastructure on a secured platform.	DMA

²² "Strategic Intent," Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, August 2019, pg. 4.

²³ "CISA Strategic Intent," pg. 4.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

Develop and exercise plans to support the application of limited energy resources during incidents.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

5.2.1	Mitigate the impacts of a disruption to the energy supply by refining and exercising the state petroleum shortage contingency plan.	WEM
5.2.2	Develop local planning considerations for consequence management linked to various types of service disruption such as natural gas outages or a long-term power outage.	WEM

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3

Enhance collaboration and partnerships across public and private sectors of critical infrastructure to improve whole-of-state resilience and recovery.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

5.3.1	Assess how the current Public Private Partnership (P3) collaboration which provides a venue for utility partners and state agencies to share information, develop plans, mitigate risk, exercise capabilities, and respond to incidents affecting the respective utility sector, may be able to be applied to additional sectors such as gas and telecommunications in order to enhance future response to sector-specific incidents. Begin building relationships in these sectors to support future efforts.	DMA
5.3.2	Strengthen our working relationship with stakeholders in order to protect agricultural critical infrastructure and enhance our ability to communicate with critical partners when necessary.	DATCP

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4

Protect elections infrastructure throughout the state.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

5.4.1	Develop training and education resources in collaboration with state agencies to improve the readiness and preparedness of local officials.	WEC
5.4.2	Improve the physical security of elections equipment by identifying and addressing physical security needs at the local level.	WEC
5.4.3	Develop contingency plans for resource constraints pertaining to elections.	WEC in coordination with DMA

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 5

Integrate lessons learned from planned event activations and state-led responses into critical infrastructure planning and preparedness.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

5.5.1	Coordinate efforts among DHS, the Healthcare Emergency Readiness Coalitions (HERCs), and private healthcare to improve the State's ability to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from a statewide health emergency.	DHS
5.5.2	Identify supply chain risks and secondary impacts to lifeline infrastructure and validate planning for these impacts through workshops and exercises.	DMA

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 6

Develop protective programs to reduce or manage risk associated with critical infrastructure.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

5.6.1	Pursue the purchase of state resources capable of supporting critical infrastructure protection at the state, local, or municipal level. Examples include mobile hardened protections to protect critical buildings, or power generation capability.	DMA
5.6.2	Increase education regarding Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) usage and threats to build community situational awareness, and bolster reporting of suspicious activity.	DMA in coordination with ACG
5.6.3	Develop draft policy which seeks to increase protections for critical infrastructure and other governmental or key sites, against potential attacks involving Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).	DMA in coordination with ACG
5.6.4	Evaluate public and private vulnerabilities statewide and identify initiatives for recommendation, which harden any associated critical infrastructure.	CIWG



Figure 6 – Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Two Rivers, WI.

STRATEGIC GOAL SIX

Enhance the state's capabilities to prevent violent extremism, including foreign and domestic terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

The fallout of terrorism events, including the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, made clear the need to prioritize protecting the homeland. The Homeland Security Council, acting through this state strategy, resolves to continue the efforts of the past two decades and to protect Wisconsinites from terrorism and other homeland security threats by pursuing efforts which address individuals or groups from engaging in such acts. Foreign based terrorism remains a low probability event in Wisconsin, but we resolve to remain vigilant. An increase of high-profile events, such as the Democratic National Convention in 2020 planned for Milwaukee, the 2024 Republic National Convention, and the potential for future high-profile national level events, requires the state and its law enforcement and homeland security entities to remain vigilant.

Although the ever-possible threat of foreign based terrorism cannot be ignored, the state must focus its effort and attention toward domestic violent extremism. It is clear domestic violent extremism, specifically that which generates criminal activity, is the most prevalent potential terrorism threat faced by the state. Domestic terrorism is not a new threat, nor is Wisconsin a stranger to such events.

To take on this challenge, we must pursue new efforts of deterrence while preserving both our security and our values and protect our shared civil rights and liberties. This is a concept recognized within the national strategy, which also recognizes that domestic violent extremism is pervasive within our national landscape, and that root motivators span a vast range of ideologies.²⁴

The council's goal is to embrace cutting edge approaches to counter domestic violent extremist threats. This leans on approaches aligned to national strategic pillars, in particular information sharing at all jurisdictional levels, and pursuing prevention resources and services for our first responders and citizens on the front lines.

We will also continue to find opportunities to work with our federal partners within the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, among others, to share resources and information in all efforts to disrupt and deter any attempts at domestic or foreign terrorism which we may face within our state.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

Enhance response options through increases in early detection and resource intervention.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

	Supporting Objectives	Lead Agency
6.1.1	Provide tools and training to local agencies, frontline personnel, and the general public on how to identify indicators of violent extremism and radicalization, and what to do when the indicators are observed.	WI DOJ - WSIC in coordination with STAC

²⁴ "National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism," United States National Security Council, June 2021, pg. 5-6.

6.1.2	Develop a concept plan for local jurisdictions to implement and utilize evidence-based threat assessment processes to determine if a person of concern is exhibiting behaviors consistent with the pathway to violence, in order to identify appropriate management and mitigation recommendations for the individual.	WI DOJ - DCI
6.1.3	Continue to develop school critical incident response teams. Share successful programs and provide resources on how to initiate this locally.	WI DOJ - OSS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

Increase protection efforts amongst soft targets, critical infrastructure, and other vulnerable targets around the state.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

6.2.1	Develop a self-assessment toolkit for public and private critical infrastructure entities to use to assess and improve their protection against and preparedness for deliberate attacks.	CIWG
6.2.2	Enhance security at state soft targets and /or events (NSSE, SEAR, etc.) by training and exercising with local partners and enhancing security measures wherever possible. Encourage local/municipal level agencies to incorporate state planning and resources early and often.	DMA

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3

Improve intelligence and information sharing.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

6.3.1	Research, identify and develop a plan for statewide adoption of an information sharing system to provide immediate access to timely and actionable intel for public safety partners that does not require additional data entry. <i>See also Supporting Objective 1.1.3</i>	ISWG
6.3.2	Encourage law enforcement, fire, and other public safety personnel to attend Threat Liaison Officer (TLO) training to increase awareness of the suspicious activity report (SAR) process in accordance with national standards.	WI DOJ - DCI

STRATEGIC GOAL SEVEN

Recognize and mitigate the influence of foreign state adversaries.

INTRODUCTION

We recognize that the unipolar world created by the collapse of the Soviet Union is transitioning into a new landscape, and that our nation once again finds itself in a period of great-power competition. While international diplomacy and foreign affairs remain quintessentially federal matters, the State of Wisconsin must support these federal efforts when possible, especially when the influence or impacts of foreign state adversaries is focused on the domestic homeland. We further recognize that our federal partners currently focus on the “national pacing challenge” of the People’s Republic of China and the “acute” threat posed by the Russian Federation, and Wisconsin consequently focused on the influence of these actors within our state.

Each state plays a critical role in the collective security of the United States. We recognize that the interests of the State of Wisconsin are inexorably linked to those of the nation as a whole. Further, nation-state competition has a direct impact within Wisconsin. Our federal partners assess that foreign state adversaries are undertaking overt and covert influencing operations to influence U.S. socio-political divisions.²⁵

The actions of foreign state adversaries within Wisconsin have direct economic consequences for our state. Intellectual property theft undertaken at the direction of adversarial nation states both damages Wisconsin business and threatens our collective security.

These “grey zone” tactics (a combination of economic espionage, information campaigning, and financial transactions) represent a concerted effort to confront our nation with non-traditional tactics.²⁶ This conflict plays out within the business and social spheres of our communities. We recognize that foreign state adversaries are influencing internal domestic matters and understand that we must proactively support national efforts at the state-and-local levels to counter ongoing threats to the stability, continuity, and good order of the Republic.

Beginning with the WIHSS 23-26, the council is adopting a new strategic goal to recognize and mitigate the influence of nation states here in Wisconsin. Further, the council will seek to build educational opportunities for our partners and stakeholders and look to maximize our efforts to support federal partners in their own efforts within this operational space.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

Increase awareness of the threats to the general public and private sector.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

	Supporting Objectives	Lead Agency
7.1.1	Establish a Foreign Adversarial Influence Working Group consisting of state and federal agencies to draft recommendations for Council consideration on mitigating the influence of foreign state adversaries.	HLSC

²⁵ “Homeland Threat Assessment,” United States Department of Homeland Security, October 2020, pg. 10-11.

²⁶ “DHS Strategic Action Plan to Counter the Threat Posed by the People’s Republic of China,” United States Department of Homeland Security – Office of Strategy, Policy and Plans, January 2021, pg. 5-6.

7.1.2	Create a focused awareness campaign related to these threats, including what to be aware of, possible targets, what influence looks like, and what to do about it.	FIWG
7.1.3	Increase awareness and education to private sector businesses with whom the state is partnering, encouraging organizations to become aware of and evaluate their risk areas, shift concerning practices where necessary, and become familiar with state and federal resources available to support them when necessary.	DOA in coordination with FIWG
7.1.4	Develop a module on foreign adversarial influence and actions for inclusion in the state training program for county and tribal emergency managers.	DMA

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

Implement actions to mitigate adversarial efforts within the State.

Supporting Objectives

Lead Agency

7.2.1	Evaluate tools for countering potential mis/dis-information across a variety of mission spaces and provide best practices to state and local partners for managing disinformation in their spheres of influence, including election administration and other critical infrastructure.	FIWG
7.2.2	Identify state agencies engaged in business with foreign entities which have been identified by federal authorities of being either engaged in intellectual property theft or required to share information with an adversarial government, and recommend corrective action to cease further engagement where appropriate.	DOA
7.2.3	Partner with federal Department of Justice to determine best practices for preventing business between state government and adversarial foreign nations.	FIWG

CONCLUSION

EVALUATION

The Homeland and Cyber Security Advisor is responsible for this strategy and the ensuing evaluation of progress. Each objective identified has a designated lead agency responsible for the coordination and facilitation of progress toward the target. The lead agency is responsible for providing a status report to the Council on the objectives in their purview upon request.

The Council, in coordination with the Office of the Governor, will provide oversight of the strategy's evaluation and receive progress updates from each lead agency on their designated objectives. Objectives with annual targets will be evaluated on whether that target was achieved each year of the strategy.

Every four years the Council will facilitate a formal update to the Homeland Security Strategy. As the state, national, and international landscapes continue to change, the Council also has the authority to initiate and implement additional updates throughout that time in support of the Governor's priorities.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A	Homeland Security Strategy Review Methodology
APPENDIX B	FEMA Core Capability Alignment
APPENDIX C	Acronyms

APPENDIX A

HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY REVIEW METHODOLOGY

The 2023-2026 update to the Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy was developed over three unique phases and led by a Strategy Review Workgroup (SRW), consisting of representatives from each of the agencies represented on the Homeland Security Council. Within this workgroup, a Core Team of representatives from the Department of Military Affairs initiated, coordinated, and led the efforts of the larger group.

METHODOLOGY AT A GLANCE



Phase One

Phase one of the update process involved establishing and convening the Strategy Review Workgroup and beginning to outline the formative elements of the Strategy, including the mission statement, vision statement, and seven strategic goals. These goals were initially informed by the Homeland and Cyber Security Advisor, Homeland Security Council, a review of past homeland security strategies, and an assessment of current national strategies.

Phase Two

Phase two, the longest and most comprehensive phase, was built to capture interagency and stakeholder input and feedback into the strategy’s strategic goals, strategic objectives, and supporting objectives. Over the course of 3 months, the Core Team conducted 14 total in-person workshops, 2 per strategic goal.

The first workshop for each goal brought together members of the SRW with a stake in the topic. The workshop focused on refining the language of the strategic goal, and brainstorming tasks and objectives to make progress toward the goal, as well as identifying additional partners to be involved in the next level of discussion.

The second workshop for each goal included both SRW members as well as the identified external stakeholders such as federal agencies, industry representatives, and additional agency-specific subject matter experts. The goal of this workshop was to refine and finalize all strategic and supporting objectives, as well as assign lead agencies for each.

Phase Three

The focus of phase three was to refine, draft, and finalize all elements of the strategy. This included review and commentary from the Homeland Security Council, a review period for all partners who participated in one of the fourteen workshops, as well as a final seminar to present the draft strategy to the SRW.

APPENDIX B

FEMA CORE CAPABILITY ALIGNMENT		
WI STRATEGIC GOALS	MISSION AREAS	LINKAGES TO NATIONAL CORE CAPABILITIES
<p>STRATEGIC GOAL ONE: Protect our citizens and resources by strengthening homeland security initiatives within Wisconsin.</p>	<p>Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Recovery</p>	<p>Planning Operational Coordination Intelligence and Information Sharing Screening, Search, and Detection Supply Chain Integrity and Security Community Resilience Long-term Vulnerability Reduction Situational Assessment</p>
<p>STRATEGIC GOAL TWO: Strengthen the State's capabilities to prevent and respond to malicious cyber activity.</p>	<p>Prevention Protection Response Mitigation Recovery</p>	<p>Planning Public Information and Warning Operational Coordination Forensics and Attribution, Intelligence and Information Sharing Interdiction and Disruption Screening/Search/Detection Access Control and Identity Verification, Cybersecurity Community Resilience Long-term Vulnerability Reduction Threats and Hazards Identification Infrastructure Systems On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement. Operational Communications Situational Assessment</p>

<p>STRATEGIC GOAL THREE: Ensure a robust and statewide all hazards incident response and recovery capability.</p>	<p>Prevention Protection Response Mitigation Recovery</p>	<p>Planning Public Information and Warning Operational Coordination Intelligence and Information Sharing Supply Chain Integrity and Security Community Resilience Long-term Vulnerability Reduction Threats and Hazards Identification Environmental Critical Transportation Fatality Management Services Fire Management and Suppression Logistics and Supply Chain Management Mass Care Services Mass Search and Rescue Operations On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services Operational Communications Health and Social Services</p>
<p>STRATEGIC GOAL FOUR: Mitigate drug related violence and reverse the impacts of illegal narcotics trade and drug trafficking organizations within the state.</p>	<p>Prevention Protection Response Mitigation Recovery</p>	<p>Planning Operational Coordination Intelligence and Information Sharing Interdiction and Disruption Screening, Search, and Detection Threats and Hazards Identification Health and Social Services Situational Assessment</p>
<p>STRATEGIC GOAL FIVE: Protect the State's critical infrastructure and enable recovery of disrupted essential services.</p>	<p>Prevention Protection Response Mitigation Recovery</p>	<p>Planning Operational Coordination Intelligence and Information Sharing Access Control and Identity Verification Physical Protective Measures Cybersecurity Supply Chain Integrity and Security Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment Community Resilience Long-term Vulnerability Reduction Threats and Hazards Identification Environmental Response/Health and Safety Critical Transportation Infrastructure Systems Logistics and Supply Chain Management Operational Communications Economic Recovery Natural and Cultural Resources Situational Assessment</p>

<p>STRATEGIC GOAL SIX: Enhance the state's capabilities to prevent violent extremism including foreign and domestic terrorism.</p>	<p>Prevention Protection Mitigation Response</p>	<p>Planning Public Information and Warning Operational Coordination Forensics and Attribution Intelligence and Information Sharing Interdiction and Disruption Screening, Search, and Detection Physical Protective Measures Cybersecurity Supply Chain Integrity and Security Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities Long-term Vulnerability Reduction Threats and Hazards Identification Environmental Response/Health and Safety On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Operational Communications Situational Assessment</p>
<p>STRATEGIC GOAL SIX: Recognize and mitigate the influence of foreign state adversaries.</p>	<p>Prevention Protection Mitigation Response</p>	<p>Planning Public Information and Warning Operational Coordination Forensics and Attribution Intelligence and Information Sharing Interdiction and Disruption Screening, Search, and Detection Physical Protective Measures Cybersecurity Supply Chain Integrity and Security Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities Long-term Vulnerability Reduction Threats and Hazards Identification Environmental Response/Health and Safety Natural and Cultural Resources Situational Assessment</p>

APPENDIX C

ACRONYMS			
ACRONYM	DEFINITION	ACRONYM	DEFINITION
ACG	Air Coordination Group	IMT	Incident Management Team
AHIMT	All-Hazard Incident Management Teams	IPAWS	Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
ALERT	Aligned Law Enforcement Response Teams	IPP	Integrated Preparedness Plan
BEOC	Business Emergency Operations Center	IPPW	Integrated Preparedness Plan Workshop
CIO	Chief Information Officer	IAM	Identity Access Management
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency	ISM	Incident Support Model
CISO	Chief Information Security Officer	ISWG	Information Sharing Working Group
CIWG	Critical Infrastructure Working Group	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
CNS	Counter-Narcotics Subcommittee	NIMS	National Incident Management System
CRT	Cyber Response Team	NPG	National Preparedness Goal
CSS	Cybersecurity Subcommittee	NQS	National Qualification System
DATCP	Department of Agriculture Trade and Consumer Protection	ODMAP	Overdose Detection Mapping Application Program
DCI	Division of Criminal Investigations	OSS	Office of School Safety
DET	Division of Enterprise Technology	P3	Public Private Partnership
DHS	Department of Health Services	SAR	Suspicious Activity Report
DLS	Division of Legal Services	SCAODA	State Council on Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse
DMA	Department of Military Affairs	SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
DNR	Department of Natural Resources	SRW	Strategy Review Workgroup
DOA	Department of Administration	STAC	Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center
DOC	Department of Corrections	STEP	Student Tools for Emergency Planning
DOJ	Department of Justice	THIRA	Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
DOT	Department of Transportation	TLO	Threat Liaison Officer
DPI	Department of Public Instruction	UAS	Unmanned Aircraft Systems
EOC	Emergency Operations Center	UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact	USDHS	United States Department of Homeland Security
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency	VOAD	Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
FIWG	Foreign Adversarial Influence Working Group	WEC	Wisconsin Elections Commission
FRS	Fentanyl-related Substances	WEM	Wisconsin Emergency Management
HERC	Healthcare Emergency Readiness Coalition	WERP	Wisconsin Emergency Response Plan
HIDTA	High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program	WHMP	Wisconsin Hazard Mitigation Plan
HLSC	Homeland Security Council	WIHSS	Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy
HAS	Homeland and Cyber Security Advisor	WING	Wisconsin National Guard
IAM	Identity Access Management	WSIC	Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center
ICS	Incident Command System	WSP	Wisconsin State Patrol



STATE OF WISCONSIN
2023 - 2026